• Gellner Nations And Nationalism Pdf

New scanxl gm keygen 2017 - and torrent. 'Prague is a stunningly beautiful town, and during the first period of my exile, which was during the war, I constantly used to dream about it, in the literal sense: it was a strong longing.' At Balliol, he studied (PPE) and specialised in philosophy. He interrupted his studies after one year to serve with the, which took part in the, and then returned to Prague to attend university there for half a term.During this period, Prague lost its strong hold over him: foreseeing the, he decided to return to England. One of his recollections of the city in 1945 was a communist poster saying: 'Everyone with a clean shield into the ', ostensibly meaning that those whose records were good during the occupation were welcome.

In reality, Gellner said, it meant exactly the opposite:If your shield is absolutely filthy we'll scrub it for you; you are safe with us; we like you the better because the filthier your record the more we have a hold on you. So all the bastards, all the distinctive, rapidly went into the Party, and it rapidly acquired this kind of character.

So what was coming was totally clear to me, and it cured me of the emotional hold which Prague had previously had over me. I could foresee that a was due: it came in '48. The precise date I couldn't foresee, but that it was due to come was absolutely obvious for various reasons. I wanted no part of it and got out as quickly as I could and forgot about it.He returned to Balliol College in 1945 to finish his degree, winning the prize and taking in 1947.

The same year, he began his academic career at the as an assistant to Professor in the Department of Moral Philosophy. He moved to the in 1949, joining the sociology department under.

Ginsberg admired philosophy and believed that philosophy and sociology were very close to each other.He employed me because I was a philosopher. Even though he was technically a professor of sociology, he wouldn't employ his own students, so I benefited from this, and he assumed that anybody in philosophy would be an evolutionary Hobhousean like himself.

It took him some time to discover that I wasn't.had preceded Ginsberg as Martin White Professor of Sociology at the LSE. Hobhouse's Mind in Evolution (1901) had proposed that society should be regarded as an organism, a product of evolution, with the individual as its basic unit, the subtext being that society would improve over time as it evolved, a view that Gellner firmly opposed.Ginsberg.

Gellner Nations And Nationalism Pdf

Was totally unoriginal and lacked any sharpness. He simply reproduced the kind of evolutionary vision which had already been formulated by Hobhouse and which incidentally was a kind of extrapolation of his own personal life: starting in Poland and ending up as a fairly influential professor at LSE.

He evolved, he had an idea of a where the lowest form of life was the drunk, Polish, anti-Semitic peasant and the next stage was the Polish gentry, a bit better, or the Staedtl, better still. And then he came to England, first to under Dawes Hicks, who was quite rational (not all that rational—he still had some anti-Semitic prejudices, it seems) and finally ended up at LSE with Hobhouse, who was so rational that rationality came out of his ears. And so Ginsberg extrapolated this, and on his view the whole of humanity moved to ever greater rationality, from drunk Polish peasant to T.L. Hobhouse and a Hampstead garden.Gellner's critique of linguistic philosophy in Words and Things (1959) focused on and the later work of, criticizing them for failing to question their own methods. The book brought Gellner critical acclaim. He obtained his Ph.D.

In 1961 with a thesis on Organization and the Role of a and became Professor of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method just one year later. Thought and Change was published in 1965, and in State and Society in Soviet Thought (1988), he examined whether Marxist regimes could be liberalized.He was elected to the in 1974. He moved to Cambridge in 1984 to head the Department of Anthropology, holding the and becoming a fellow of, which provided him with a relaxed atmosphere where he enjoyed drinking beer and playing with the students.

Described by the as 'brilliant, forceful, irreverent, mischievous, sometimes perverse, with a biting wit and love of irony', he was famously popular with his students, was willing to spend many extra hours a day tutoring them, and was regarded as a superb public speaker and gifted teacher.His Plough, Sword and Book (1988) investigated the, and Conditions of Liberty (1994) sought to explain the collapse of. In 1993, he returned to Prague, now rid of communism, and to the new, where he became head of the Center for the Study of Nationalism, a program funded by, the American billionaire philanthropist, to study the rise of in the post-communist countries of eastern and central. On 5 November 1995, after returning from a conference in, he suffered a heart attack and died at his flat in Prague, one month short of his 70th birthday.Gellner was noted for his questionable sense of humour. His daughter, Sarah Gellner, revealed that one of her father's favourite jokes was 'Rape, rape, rape, all summer long', and that 'If there was one thing Dad disliked more than feminists, it was homosexual men.'

Words and Things. Gellner discovered his interest in linguistic philosophy while at Balliol.With the publication in 1959 of Words and Things, his first book, Gellner achieved fame and even notoriety among his fellow philosophers, as well as outside the discipline, for his fierce attack on (or 'linguistic philosophy', Gellner's preferred phrase). Ordinary language philosophy, in one form or another, was the dominant approach at at the time (although the philosophers themselves denied that they were part of any unified school). He first encountered the strong ideological hold of linguistic philosophy while at Balliol:At that time the orthodoxy best described as linguistic philosophy, inspired by Wittgenstein, was crystallizing and seemed to me totally and utterly misguided. Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. Communities are ultimate.

He didn't put it this way, but that was what it amounted to. And this doesn't make sense in a world in which communities are not stable and are not clearly isolated from each other. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein managed to sell this idea, and it was enthusiastically adopted as an unquestionable revelation. It is very hard nowadays for people to understand what the atmosphere was like then. This was the Revelation. It wasn't doubted.

But it was quite obvious to me it was wrong. It was obvious to me the moment I came across it, although initially, if your entire environment, and all the bright people in it, hold something to be true, you assume you must be wrong, not understanding it properly, and they must be right. And so I explored it further and finally came to the conclusion that I did understand it right, and it was rubbish, which indeed it is.Words and Things is fiercely critical of the work of, and many others. Ryle refused to have the book reviewed in the philosophical journal (which he edited), and (who had written an approving foreword) protested in a letter to. A response from Ryle and a lengthy correspondence ensued.

Social anthropology In the 1950s, Gellner discovered his great love of.

This thoughtful and penetrating book, addressed to political scientists, sociologists, historians, and anthropologists, interprets nationalism in terms of its social roots, which it locates in industrial social organization. Professor Gellner asserts here that a society's affluence and economic growth depend on innovation, occupational mobility, the effectiveness of the This thoughtful and penetrating book, addressed to political scientists, sociologists, historians, and anthropologists, interprets nationalism in terms of its social roots, which it locates in industrial social organization.

Professor Gellner asserts here that a society's affluence and economic growth depend on innovation, occupational mobility, the effectiveness of the mass media, universal literacy, and an all-embracing educational system based on a shared, standard idiom. These factors, taken together, govern the relationship between culture and the state. Political units that do not conform to the principle, 'one state, one culture' feel the strain in the form of nationalistic activity. Gellner gets quite a bit right about the invention of nationalism- especially how the practices of high culture become masked as ancient and inviolable folk tradition- but he also gets quite a bit wrong.

Perhaps he's right about the creation of a specific type of nationalism, one that is predicated on an industrial or post-industrial society and expressed most strongly in Central and Western Europe, and he's playing fast and loose with his words, but there seem to be plenty of nationalist Gellner gets quite a bit right about the invention of nationalism- especially how the practices of high culture become masked as ancient and inviolable folk tradition- but he also gets quite a bit wrong. Perhaps he's right about the creation of a specific type of nationalism, one that is predicated on an industrial or post-industrial society and expressed most strongly in Central and Western Europe, and he's playing fast and loose with his words, but there seem to be plenty of nationalist movements that have occurred in largely pre-industrial societies, especially outside Europe. I far prefer Benedict Anderson's account, which suggests that it is the printed text and its distribution, above all else, that builds the imagined community requisite for nationalism.But as I said Gellner is right a lot of the time, and he's thought-provoking and clear-eyed throughout. His illustration of the fictional states of 'Ruritania' and 'Megalomania' is honestly more entertaining than most of the fiction I've read in recent months.

In an era that is doctrinally anti-(explicit-)doctrine, people like to emphasize that grand theories, even the putatively best ones, have blinders, and that the otherwise orthodox are at their most interesting when they ramble off the plantation to make ad hoc observations. Well, they do, and sometimes they are, but the opposite is at least equally true, even in the case of the worst grand theories. Gellner is at his best and most interesting when he operates within the confines of a not even In an era that is doctrinally anti-(explicit-)doctrine, people like to emphasize that grand theories, even the putatively best ones, have blinders, and that the otherwise orthodox are at their most interesting when they ramble off the plantation to make ad hoc observations. Well, they do, and sometimes they are, but the opposite is at least equally true, even in the case of the worst grand theories. Gellner is at his best and most interesting when he operates within the confines of a not even explicitly acknowledged structural functionalism (even when he raises dissent from, say, Durkheim-cum-Parsons on the degree of differentiation in modern society,) his ad hoc observations, by contrast, add little to the analysis. Like Benedict Anderson, Gellner is interested in the apparent empirical connection between mass literacy and the rise of nationalism, here understood as the demand that political boundaries correspond in some way to cultural ones; his answer is that in mass-literate societies with a complex division of labor the ancient Stands or castes or whatever that made up agricultural civilization are no longer culturally self-reproducing, but that all cultural reproduction now must proceed through the mass educational institutions overseen by the state.

Within this framework he is able to provide an at least facially plausible account of the universal rise of nationality, his less systematic attempts to explain the different waves or varieties of nationalism are correspondingly less persuasive, but on the whole, his abstract and general account is not incompatible with alternative accounts (of which there are many) of this latter question.To a great extent Gellner's proposals have already been absorbed into, and critiqued by, the subsequent literature on nationalism. However, he states them more clearly (and entertainingly!) than you are likely to find elsewhere, and this is a short book, so you have little to lose by giving it a read. Nations and Nationalism, Ernest GellnerNationalism, according to Ernest Gellner, is a political principle that binds the State and the nation in a tightly knit framework.

However, what influences nationalism? Is it the need for a nation that engenders nationalism? Gellner argues that nationalism brings about the formation of the nation; the need for an ideology that is culturally rooted, economically sustainable and politically active generates nationalism.Gellner affirms that it is the Nations and Nationalism, Ernest GellnerNationalism, according to Ernest Gellner, is a political principle that binds the State and the nation in a tightly knit framework. However, what influences nationalism? Is it the need for a nation that engenders nationalism?

Gellner argues that nationalism brings about the formation of the nation; the need for an ideology that is culturally rooted, economically sustainable and politically active generates nationalism.Gellner affirms that it is the industrial revolution that demanded the formation of nations. An industrial society presupposes the presence of a populace that speaks and writes a common language. Most importantly, people need to possess technical abilities to sustain themselves in the industrial era. A highly centralized education system imbibes these virtues on the people; thereby resulting in the formation of a specific culture which is strengthened by the governmental apparatus.What is problematic about Gellner’s argument is that the birth of nationalism has not always followed this pattern, especially in colonized countries or present-day Third World Countries!

In the face of sharp colonial oppression, people united to demand an independent nation. It is in the idea of nationalizing the nation that nationalism took a definite pattern in these countries.

Hence, those who did not fall within the national frame were considered as minorities. For instance, the Muslims who opted to stay in India after 1947 Partition. It's a great book to come up with nationalism. I suppose this book has comprehensive methods to express why nations must exist for modernity process.

This book gets an only holistic view about nations and nationalism on this subject. I suggest reading Gellner's theory instead of Anderson and other post-structuralist academics. Of course, they share a common core on some points, but the book differs from other books on historical analysis and the sociological imagination.I've read many books on It's a great book to come up with nationalism. I suppose this book has comprehensive methods to express why nations must exist for modernity process.

This book gets an only holistic view about nations and nationalism on this subject. I suggest reading Gellner's theory instead of Anderson and other post-structuralist academics. Of course, they share a common core on some points, but the book differs from other books on historical analysis and the sociological imagination.I've read many books on 'nation' concept, but only two of them are fascinating to express the concept's complexity. One is Anthony Smith and another one is Ernest Gellner. If you don't know anything about nation and nationalism, but you are curious on this subject, you should read the book to understand the nation concept. Of course, nations, like everything, are socially constructed, but it does not take account of anything anymore. Gellner develops a systematic theory of nationalism.

The book is self-contained and relatively easy to read. Accessible even to newcomers to the topic as it starts by introducing the nationalist principle and the state. From this point onward, Gellner explores the social causes and pre-conditions to nationalism and its deep connections to culture and education. This analysis and its consequences and implications are the core of the book.

I consider the book (especially chapters one to seven) as Gellner develops a systematic theory of nationalism. The book is self-contained and relatively easy to read. Accessible even to newcomers to the topic as it starts by introducing the nationalist principle and the state. From this point onward, Gellner explores the social causes and pre-conditions to nationalism and its deep connections to culture and education. This analysis and its consequences and implications are the core of the book. I consider the book (especially chapters one to seven) as brilliant and a must-read.In my opinion, the weakest part of the book is that, although it gives satisfactory explanations of the different phases of nationalism and nationalist action, it says little about the transition between these phases and the forces behind them.

I also missed a bit of historical data to back certain claims in the book. My opinion of this book isn't related to its value as a seminal work in the field, but for the fact that such a well-known professor didn't have an editor who told him to stop using commas indiscriminately. My biggest pet peeve about many academic books is the total lack of writing skill and style from authors that takes away from the substance of their books, and this is a prime example. Now that I'm done with my rant, I can say that Gellner's work might seem outdated - he ignores the Soviet My opinion of this book isn't related to its value as a seminal work in the field, but for the fact that such a well-known professor didn't have an editor who told him to stop using commas indiscriminately. My biggest pet peeve about many academic books is the total lack of writing skill and style from authors that takes away from the substance of their books, and this is a prime example. Now that I'm done with my rant, I can say that Gellner's work might seem outdated - he ignores the Soviet Union almost completely in his work - but it has salience because it can be debated and picked apart. I'm not convinced that nationalism is a by-product of industrialism, as he claims, or that the rationality of the process necessarily explains why, for example, someone is willing to die for his country.

Read for Anthropolgy 391: Nation Building and NationalismThis was a struggle to get through due to complex writing and a lot of references to historical events (I don't have a good handle on world history). But I came out the other side having learned something, and probably able to read the book again and get even more out of it.Discussed are ideas like:-The need for a shared experience through some form of mass media-Folk culture as a precursor to nationalism-The necessity of 'forgetting' as Read for Anthropolgy 391: Nation Building and NationalismThis was a struggle to get through due to complex writing and a lot of references to historical events (I don't have a good handle on world history).

But I came out the other side having learned something, and probably able to read the book again and get even more out of it.Discussed are ideas like:-The need for a shared experience through some form of mass media-Folk culture as a precursor to nationalism-The necessity of 'forgetting' as an integral part of nationalist sentiment. This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it,Starts off as a promising study of the consequences of Calvinist reformation and the mathematicization of the world, tying the emergence of nationalism to the needs of modern capitalism. Yet then, Gellner develops a theory in which nationalism is the glue that holds different factions together. He constantly overlooks the hidden depth beneath the ideological surface of nationalism, the latter being but a tool of the propertied to sustain the systematized exploitation. Largely a waste of time. There are few original arguments here and many of Gellner’s core claims are overly simplistic; everything meaningful here could be encapsulated in the length of a journal article.

He also declined to provide the reader footnotes – I counted something like 6 in total – for the reader to pursue further research (or to fact-check him!). Hobsbawm’s 1990 text is a much better introduction to nationalism, and contributes much more to the discussion.Gellner makes several major Largely a waste of time. There are few original arguments here and many of Gellner’s core claims are overly simplistic; everything meaningful here could be encapsulated in the length of a journal article. He also declined to provide the reader footnotes – I counted something like 6 in total – for the reader to pursue further research (or to fact-check him!). Hobsbawm’s 1990 text is a much better introduction to nationalism, and contributes much more to the discussion.Gellner makes several major arguments about nationalism and nations: that the concept of nation is bound to a specific historical period, that there is no core definition of nation (although ‘culture’ is paramount), and that nationalism is an inevitable corollary of industrial society and modernity. Much of what he says has already been fleshed out by other writers; his only major contribution is the claim that nationalism was the side-product of industrial society’s division of labour that allows greater social mobility and requires state-wide basic education.

This view contrasts with the other ‘modernists,’ who emphasize the mass communication and linguistic centralization of modern society. However, most of Gellner’s arguments supporting this view should have more detail, with some being so implausible.

The fact that Gellner doesn’t cite is not helpful.Gellner first advanced this^ position in 1964, when it might have been novel. However, this book was published in 1983 (my edition was 1987) during a lively anglophone debate on nationalism, and Gellner has not even tried to evaluate or synthesize with the views of his peers Nairn, Hobsbawm, Breuilly, Anderson, Armstrong, Smith, and others.

He has spilled some ink to criticize Kedourie’s work.There is a major concept Gellner uses that I fundamentally disagree with. He discusses ‘culture’ as a homogeneous shared atmosphere of societies, “no longer a diversified, locality-tied” culture, something propagated by the state. To Gellner, this state-made high culture is the bedrock of nationalism.Culture is not an opaque block of symmetric molecular composition. We can understand that there is such a thing as American culture, but that there are enormous variations within it. That doesn’t stop America from being a nation, nor do the many local cultures of Germany preclude such a thing as German nationhood. The inadequacies of Gellner’s view shows when we consider the frontiers of ‘nations’ or ‘cultures,’ such as in the mostly German-speaking Alsace-Lorraine where plebiscites repeatedly declared for France, in southern France where the local tongue was more comprehensible to a Catalan than a Parisian, or in Scotland wavering between a Scottish or British identity. The ideas of a pan-Arabic or pan-Slavic nation have presently failed, unlike the ideas of a pan-German or pan-Italian nation.

The point is that culture too is constructed and inherently in tension – every individual human being conceptualizes culture and nation differently. Gellner’s view is unbelievably simplistic, and I would recommend the ethnosymbolists for a deeper understanding of culture.

This text is rife with, in my opinion, minor misunderstandings here and there, but this is the biggest one and my biggest criticism. This an essential text in the study of nationalism. Gellner is a seminal figure in what has come to be known as the modernist view of nationalism, having laid the groundwork for the arguments made here in Thought and Change (1964). While Carlton Hayes had linked nationalism to modernity roughly 50 years earlier, his emphasis on nationalism as a replacement for religion offered a rather limited explanation of the centrality of nationalism to modern society, which Gellner offers here.Gellner's This an essential text in the study of nationalism. Gellner is a seminal figure in what has come to be known as the modernist view of nationalism, having laid the groundwork for the arguments made here in Thought and Change (1964). While Carlton Hayes had linked nationalism to modernity roughly 50 years earlier, his emphasis on nationalism as a replacement for religion offered a rather limited explanation of the centrality of nationalism to modern society, which Gellner offers here.Gellner's key and radical argument is that nationalism has created nations, not the other way around, and that nations took shape with the industrial revolution and the massive reshaping of society that shifted the majority of the labor force from the fields producing fields to factors. This shift necessitated the creation of the universal high cultures and mass education we now treat as normal.Thirty-five years after its publication, and thirty years after my first reading of this book turned my head around, I have a number of quibbles.

His explanation for how nations took shape as societies moved from agrarian society to industrial society is somewhat magical, and too conciliatory to the perennial/primordialists he was arguing against, as illustrated by his charming parable of Ruritania and Meglomania. (That said his Note on the Weakness of Nationalism offers an excellent antidote) There is now also a lot of evidence that the shift he describes lay more in states attempting to develop a more direct connection with their subjects/citizenry than in industrialization.

After all nationalism was acquiring currency in many parts of Central and East-Central Europe before industrialization had taken hold. Finally, his belief that national cultural homogeneity was part of Weberian rationality seems a quaint relic of the postwar era, when the Wilsonian transformation of Europe was reinforced and strengthened by ethnic cleansing undertaken during and immediately after World War II. In fact, as Pieter Judson has shown modernization and multilingualism could go hand in hand.Despite those differences, the fact remains that those criticism can be made because of Gellner's own work. In short the study of nationalism from the 1970s on is a footnote and amendment to Gellner's original argument, which is not to detract from the contributions made by Benedict Anderson, or Rogers Brubaker, or Tim Nairn, to name a few. I was intrigued by the ambitious title of this book and was expecting a 600 page tome on how nationalism has impacted the current political entities of the world. Instead I got a rather succinct theory on the origin of nationalism.Despite sparing no opportunity to point out the failings of Marxist interpretations of history, Professor Gellner sees an economic cause behind the rise of nationalism. As societies passed from primary to secondary economic activities in the eighteenth and nineteenth I was intrigued by the ambitious title of this book and was expecting a 600 page tome on how nationalism has impacted the current political entities of the world.

Instead I got a rather succinct theory on the origin of nationalism.Despite sparing no opportunity to point out the failings of Marxist interpretations of history, Professor Gellner sees an economic cause behind the rise of nationalism. As societies passed from primary to secondary economic activities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they needed a literate work force capable of a much more sophisticated division of labor, as well as an increased social mobility allowing the most competent to run the economy. This was accomplished by unifying cultural and political entities and having the political entity (state) provide the necessary education for a successful secondary economy. Nationalism was a result of people identifying with their state, as the state became more culturally homogeneous.There is obviously a little more to it than that, but that is the main premise. It will seem much more complex as you wade through Gellner's prose.

He is fond of the type of sentence where you have forgotten by the end how it started. This is not a book intended for the general reader. Gellner's 'Nations and Nationalism' is an indispensable contribution to the study of nationalism, offering helpful and alluring perspectives on its rise to becoming the dominant political paradigm/ideology of the modern world.

Yet Gellner's theory, as I hope to demonstrate, is insufficient by itself in accounting for the variety of processes that helped establish nationalism's dominance. Gellner is perhaps best thought of, then, as one piece (albeit an important piece) of a larger pie.Gellner's 'Nations and Nationalism' is an indispensable contribution to the study of nationalism, offering helpful and alluring perspectives on its rise to becoming the dominant political paradigm/ideology of the modern world. Yet Gellner's theory, as I hope to demonstrate, is insufficient by itself in accounting for the variety of processes that helped establish nationalism's dominance. Gellner is perhaps best thought of, then, as one piece (albeit an important piece) of a larger pie.Terminology:By nationalism, I mean the process (generally agreed upon by scholars) lasting from approximately the early-18th century to the mid-20th century, characterised by the development of the notion of nationhood by elites and the subsequent movement towards demanding this 'national' identity be asserted at the state level. This definition is in itself somewhat elusive, begging the question - what exactly constitutes a 'national' identity? What is a 'nation'?Overview of Gellner's theory:Gellner's central theory is that nationalism (which he defines as an ideology holding that the political and national unit must be congruent) was a response to modernity. That is: the unprecedented growth of industrialisation, increased urbanisation, and accompanying spread of information in the period mentioned above.

Gellner posits the pre-industrial, agrarian world was too stratified to provide sufficient ground for the growth of 'national' identities. In fact, he argues, the modern notion of 'nationhood' - characterised by a loyalty derived from geographical territory - would have made little sense to agrarian peoples, whose lives were too insular.In contrast, the modern world brought with it large-scale stratification of traditional labour roles, the spread of information like never before, and interaction between various peoples on a scale previously unimaginable. Gellner argues nationalism(s) offered a new vocabulary (quite literally, with the spread of standardised languages) and mode of thinking to contend with and navigate this new reality.Education:If nationalism derived from increased industrialisation for Gellner, the spread of nationalism as an idea was facilitated primarily by education. He argues the increasing democratisation of education amongst lower, previously excluded, classes provided fertile ground upon which elites could 'teach' populations how to think of themselves and their state. This thesis holds true in consideration of, say, the spread of Turkish nationalism after WW1 - where Ataturk overhauled education.

While these reforms did nurture unprecedented growth of literacy rates in Turkey, they also introduced a new way of thinking about 'Turkish' identity - flirting occasionally with pseudo-historic & pseudo-scientific theories of race.Criticisms:Yet Gellner's almost-exclusive look at education as facilitator of the spread of nationalism leaves something to be desired. Indeed, as the example above shows, education was a central (and perhaps even the primary) driver of this spread. But it wasn't the only.

In this respect, other theorists like Benedict Anderson (who attributed nationalism's spread to the rise in print media) fill in the gaps. In some case studies, eg.

Britain, education and print media might be considered equally as important in helping spread nationalist ideas.In another regard, Gellner's 'modernisation' thesis fails to look at the interaction between elites and wider civil society. Like John Breuilly, John Hall has explained of Michael Mann's writings on nationalism that 19th century Europe saw a growth in the communicative capacities of civil society at large, and nationalism offered a way in which hitherto corrupt state elites could control the growing tides of civil unrest and mitigate civil society's demand for greater representation. One such case study supporting this might be the Chartist movement in Britain, which coincided with the rise of British nationalism. Gellner, however, offers no consideration of such interacting forces - this, despite alluding to nationalism as a force through which the 'higher culture' comes to dominate a 'lower culture'.Furthermore, while Gellner posits modern 'national' identity would have made little sense to agrarian peoples, he fails to offer a picture of how those people actually did thinking of themselves. On remedying this omission, Armstrong's 'Nations Before Nationalism' goes a long way. Nor does Gellner critically examine any historical case studies that are often associated with pre-modern nationhood, for which Anthony Smith's work might prove a helpful companion.Finally, Gellner's theory is somewhat functionalist.

That is, he views nationalism as the inevitable result of an historical process. His assertion nationalism offered a way of negotiating the new reality of modernity leaves little room for consideration of how other processes (such as civil society co-option by elites) contributed to its spread.

Nor does it acknowledge how different nationalisms arose in different social and political contexts. Rather, Gellner implies nationalism performs a necessary function in the modern world.

This further fails to account for the various counter-nationalist movements, and ultimately reduces the role of agency in the process of 'nationalisation'.Conclusions:On the whole, Gellner's theory should form a central part of a grand theory of nationalism, in which various theories should be seen to compliment - rather than oppose - one another. His ideas of modernity and education as central to the 'nationalisation' process make the book indispensable, and a must-read for anyone studying the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the work suffers from some serious omissions that can be remedied through borrowing from other theorists.Sources/Further Reading:John A Armstrong, Nations Before NationalismBenedict Anderson, Imagined CommunitiesLinda Colley, BritonsErnest Gellner, Nations and NationalismAndrew Mango, AtaturkSukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of NationalismAnthony D Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. A fine work on the historical origins of nationalism. Gellner credits the coming of the industrial age, and its concomitant need for cultural homogeneity (as people are forced more and more into becoming interchangeable and mobile cogs in the social machinery), for the rise of nationalism(s)-which he defines simply as the idea that political and cultural boundaries ought to be in line.Gellner takes no hard stance on whether or not the rise of nationalism is a positive development. Indeed one A fine work on the historical origins of nationalism.

Gellner credits the coming of the industrial age, and its concomitant need for cultural homogeneity (as people are forced more and more into becoming interchangeable and mobile cogs in the social machinery), for the rise of nationalism(s)-which he defines simply as the idea that political and cultural boundaries ought to be in line.Gellner takes no hard stance on whether or not the rise of nationalism is a positive development. Indeed one can characterize his stance as fatalistic: We could not have advanced without the advent of nations, for better or worse.

Nations simply fill a role-they function to make advanced industry possible. And on this Gellner has a point: without some 'nation'-like form of social organization, advancement as has been witnessed over the past few centuries would not have been imaginable. And yet, some may ask whether industrial advancement has been worth the cost, not only in the form of aggressive nationalisms such as that of Nazi Germany but also in the form of the environmental destruction wrought by the limitless desire to expand material values that is so characteristic of the industrial structure. As none of us lived in the agrarian period, to say that it was in any way superior to our own era would be idealistic guesswork. We cannot go backwards, and any efforts to do so will doubtless prove futile and tragic (see Pol Pot's Cambodia). To wit, the age of nationalism and industrialization must progress to a new, never-before seen epoch that we cannot now imagine. It too will be flawed.

This did much for reframing a lot of my thoughts and assumptions about education and intellectualism. I've drunk the kool-aid of industrialism, it would seem. According to Gellner, previous to industrialism, although there was not as much job specialization, the gap between each specialty was actually much larger. People would train their whole lives for one profession, and changing jobs was all but impossible. The customs and vocabulary of each specialty were much too involved and esoteric, This did much for reframing a lot of my thoughts and assumptions about education and intellectualism. I've drunk the kool-aid of industrialism, it would seem. According to Gellner, previous to industrialism, although there was not as much job specialization, the gap between each specialty was actually much larger.

People would train their whole lives for one profession, and changing jobs was all but impossible. The customs and vocabulary of each specialty were much too involved and esoteric, understandable only to insiders who had grown up in the convoluted customs.Post industrialism, even if jobs became much more specialized, the training for all jobs became more general. Everyone now receives the same education, and training for a specialty is just a quick last-minute dab on top. This leaves education, literacy, and things associated with 'high' culture to be monopolized by one particular specialty, educators.

But in any given country or region, the culture that gets absorbed as 'high' culture is essentially arbitrary, and accident of history. There's nothing in particular about ancient Greek mythology that makes it the premier literary culture; just by accident that was what ended up falling into the high class literature. So reading this book drew out an issue that has pricked at me from time to time: how strongly are my interests correlated with my class/ethnicity/demographic? I like to think that some things, like respect for science and mathematics and a few other attitudes relating to intellectual honesty and humanism, are essentially universal.

But I am often skeptical of this thought, and some passages in the book heightened that skepticism. One of the 'must-read's in the field of identity studies in political science (the others include Benedict Anderson and Hobsbawm). Gellner's argument makes sense if you know that he had Eastern Europe in mind when he wrote this book.

His definition of nationalism on page 1 is most frequently quoted. His argument is an excessive generalization (almost economic determinism) for diverse experiences of nation-building around the world, but Gellner most importantly established the core argument for One of the 'must-read's in the field of identity studies in political science (the others include Benedict Anderson and Hobsbawm). Gellner's argument makes sense if you know that he had Eastern Europe in mind when he wrote this book. His definition of nationalism on page 1 is most frequently quoted. His argument is an excessive generalization (almost economic determinism) for diverse experiences of nation-building around the world, but Gellner most importantly established the core argument for the 'modernization' school in nationalism studies, and it was probably the first attempt to engage in the question of nationalism within the poli sci framework. You probably won't buy his argument, but the book is quite important since everyone who writes about nationalism tries to refute his argument. It is sometimes said that historiographers and historians are like a married couple that live together but have long since ceased to speak to each other.

They live separate lives. This text reflects that divide.

Like Hobsbawm before him, Gellner takes the traditional Eurocentric, pro-French Enlightenment view of the rise of nations, nation-states and nationalism. And like Hobsbawm's argument, it is flawed not just by its Eurocentrism, but by ignoring certain fundamental facts (e.g. The unique It is sometimes said that historiographers and historians are like a married couple that live together but have long since ceased to speak to each other. They live separate lives. This text reflects that divide. Like Hobsbawm before him, Gellner takes the traditional Eurocentric, pro-French Enlightenment view of the rise of nations, nation-states and nationalism. And like Hobsbawm's argument, it is flawed not just by its Eurocentrism, but by ignoring certain fundamental facts (e.g.

The unique development of the Tudor state). He says to be a a Nation, a people need a shared narrative. Wow, so relevant to the current turmoil with alternative facts being pushed by Hannity, Kellyanne Conway, S'uckabee Sanders, etc. Our situation being just that in our Nation, a struggle in the face of the internet and proliferating cable news networks cleaving our sources of news into a multiheaded dragon all competing to control our Nation's narrative. Didnt Been Franklin say something like.And now we have a Republic, if only we can He says to be a a Nation, a people need a shared narrative. Wow, so relevant to the current turmoil with alternative facts being pushed by Hannity, Kellyanne Conway, S'uckabee Sanders, etc.

Our situation being just that in our Nation, a struggle in the face of the internet and proliferating cable news networks cleaving our sources of news into a multiheaded dragon all competing to control our Nation's narrative. Didnt Been Franklin say something like.And now we have a Republic, if only we can keep it.